Anderson, David L. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. by Johns, Andrew L.
The Journal of Conflict Studies
185
and Britain’s lack of sufficient forces for defence of the Far East was one conse-
quence of that. Had Britain been able to retain a much larger Gurkha force, he
says, the Malayan Communist Party might have been deterred from launching its
insurgency in the first place. That may be a debatable assertion, but even if deter-
rence had failed, Britain would have been better prepared to contain the insur-
gency at the outset. Furthermore, Britain would have had greater flexibility in
balancing the Malayan campaign and the defence of Hong Kong, and it would
have precluded the need to extend the period of National Service in the UK.
The thoroughness with which Gregorian probes his subject means that his
book is not an easy read. It also suffers from the common quirk of dissertations-
become-books: over-zealous documentation. The endnotes could have been con-
densed to reduce repetition. Those minor problems aside, Raffi Gregorian has
made a major contribution to the historiography of the Malayan Emergency by
situating that campaign within the complex of Britain’s strategic aims, dilemmas,
and achievements in the post-war Far East. 
David A. Charters is Director of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the
University of New Brunswick.
Anderson, David L.  The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2002.  
Three decades after the fall of Saigon the lessons and legacies of the
Vietnam War remain a source of fascination and curiosity to some, contention
and debate to many more.  As a result, the literature on the Vietnam War contin-
ues to grow almost exponentially as scholars take advantage of newly opened
archives, new methodological and interpretive approaches, and newly declassi-
fied documents to explore original questions and revisit traditional ones.  For
those unfamiliar with the war, this wealth of scholarship can be daunting.  It is
fortunate, then, that leading Vietnam War expert David L. Anderson (Trapped By
Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953-1961 [1991];
Facing My Lai:  Moving Beyond the Massacre [1998]) has compiled a wonder-
fully concise and exceedingly useful (and usable) resource designed to help read-
ers understand the essential facts and interpretations of this long and tragic con-
flict.
The book is divided into five parts, covering both factual and critical
information in an easy-to-use format.  The first section provides a general narra-
tive overview organized around the main issues, arguments, and controversies
surrounding the Vietnam War from early Vietnamese history through the postwar
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period.  The second section, “The Vietnam War from A to Z,” contains short
descriptive and analytical encyclopedia entries covering key individuals and
events.  The third section is an extensive chronology of events related to
Vietnamese history since 207 BC, the wars in Indochina, and the postwar period
through President Bill Clinton’s diplomatic recognition of Vietnam in 1995.  The
fourth section, which will be of particular interest to those teaching about the
Vietnam experience, is an annotated guide to the major films, documentaries,
internet sites, and other resources related to the conflict, including a chronologi-
cal bibliography of the major primary and secondary sources, bibliographies, and
reference works on the conflict.  The fifth and final section contains excerpts
from primary source documents and statistical data (e.g. troop levels, casualties,
expenditures, bombing tonnage) relating to the war.
Given the complexities of the conflict and the controversy surrounding it,
Anderson has done a remarkable job in distilling the voluminous literature and
resources on the war.  To his credit, Anderson carefully stays objective through-
out the narrative section, examining the various facets of the main questions –
e.g. why successive administrations chose Vietnam as the test case of American
commitment in the fight against communism; whether Kennedy would have
withdrawn from Vietnam had he lived; what lessons emerged from the war – and
avoiding the temptation of providing definitive answers.  Indeed, while he does
argue that the war resulted from a misapplication of the US policy of contain-
ment, he urges the reader to examine all of the interpretations on the origins and
climax of the war before reaching a conclusion.  Given the nature of the book, it
is difficult to argue with the choices Anderson makes in terms of what to include
in and leave out of the volume.  The only significant point on which one might
find fault with the book is the lack of excerpts from the major interpretive works
on the war; their inclusion would have fit in nicely with the scope and purpose
of the volume.
Anderson has clearly achieved his goal of providing the reader with “a ver-
satile, objective, and reliable way to understand the intense and significant
debate over the war.” (p. xii)  Although neither as detailed in its narrative as
George Herring’s standard synthesis, America’s Longest War, nor as comprehen-
sive in its depth of coverage as reference works like Stanley Kutler’s
Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War, The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War is an
outstanding primer to the conflict and the scholarship it has inspired.  Scholars
will find it useful as a quick and practical reference guide, and it is highly rec-
ommended to both advanced secondary and university level students seeking an
introduction to the conflict in Indochina.
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